Using Subjective Confidence to Improve Metacognitive Monitoring Accuracy and Control by Miller, Tyler
  
 
 
USING SUBJECTIVE CONFIDENCE TO IMPROVE METACOGNITIVE 
MONITORING ACCURACY AND CONTROL 
 
A Dissertation  
by 
TYLER MICHAEL MILLER 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
August 2012 
 
 
Major Subject: Psychology 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using Subjective Confidence to Improve Metacognitive Monitoring Accuracy and 
Control 
Copyright 2012 Tyler Michael Miller  
  
USING SUBJECTIVE CONFIDENCE TO IMPROVE METACOGNITIVE 
MONITORING ACCURACY AND CONTROL 
 
A Dissertation 
by 
TYLER MICHAEL MILLER 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved by: 
Chair of Committee,  Lisa Geraci 
Committee Members, Steven M. Smith 
 Terrence M. Barnhardt 
 Louis G.Tassinary 
Head of Department, Ludy T. Benjamin 
 
August 2012 
 
Major Subject: Psychology 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Using Subjective Confidence to Improve Metacognitive Monitoring Accuracy and 
Control. (August 2012) 
Tyler Michael Miller, B.A., Buena Vista University; 
M.S., Emporia State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lisa Geraci 
 
Metacognition is defined as a person’s awareness of the capabilities and vulnerabilities 
of their own cognition and also encompasses the actions that a person takes as a result of 
that awareness. The awareness and actions that a person takes are known as monitoring 
and control respectively. The relationship between accurate monitoring and improved 
control and performance has been borne out in multiple research studies. Unfortunately, 
people’s metacognitive judgments are far from perfect; for low performers, that 
inaccuracy is most often in the form of overconfidence. Attempts to improve 
metacognitive monitoring and control have led to mixed results. The purpose of the 
experiments here was to examine whether participants could use confidence in their 
predictions to recalibrate subsequent performance predictions and to determine if 
improved metacognitive monitoring would confer benefits to metacognitive control. 
Would participants become less overconfident and would they then decide to study 
longer to improve performance? In three experiments, participants made predictions 
about their upcoming memory performance and reported their confidence that their 
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predictions were accurate. Participants then adjusted their predictions so that they could 
be more confident the prediction was accurate. Experiment 1 served as a proof of 
concept – it established that confidence judgments could be used to improve 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy. Experiment 2 explored the boundary conditions of 
the calibration improvement effect. The results revealed that continuous improvement in 
performance predictions was possible after reporting confidence. And finally, 
Experiment 3 showed that participants’ improved monitoring accuracy did not influence 
metacognitive control, which in this study was allocation of study time. One possible 
reason why reporting confidence did not affect metacognitive control was that 
participants required feedback about the benefits of confidence judgments before the 
improved calibration effect would influence their decisions to allocate study time. Future 
research will examine the influence of reporting confidence and other interventions to 
improve calibration and performance.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW* 
 
 If a student in an anatomy course were required to memorize the bones of the 
human body  to do well on a final exam, it is likely that the student would recognize the 
difficulty in memorizing these items without extensive study.  Because of this 
awareness, the student would choose to study the bones. That student’s awareness of the 
difficulty of memorizing the to-be-remembered information and the student’s decision 
and action to study make up two related processes of metacognition. Metacognition is 
the term used to refer to a person’s awareness of the state of their own cognition in 
addition to the capabilities and vulnerabilities of cognitive processes—the awareness of 
the difficulty of memorizing the bones of the human body. Secondly, metacognition 
refers to the actions a person takes as a result of that awareness—the prudent decision to 
study instead of attempting to remember them without aid. The awareness and actions a 
person takes are known as monitoring and control respectively. Records of people’s 
awareness of the capabilities and 
____________ 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory and Cognition. 
 
*Parts of this chapter are reprinted with permission from “Training Metacognition in the 
classroom: The influence of incentives and feedback on exam predictions” by Tyler M. 
Miller and Lisa Geraci, 2011. Metacognition and Learning, 6, 303-314, Copyright 2011 
by Springer Science + Business Media. 
 
*Parts of this chapter are reprinted with permission from “Unskilled but aware: 
Reinterpreting overconfidence in low-performing students” by Tyler M. Miller and Lisa 
Geraci, 2011. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
37, 502-506, Copyright 2011 by American Psychological Association. 
 
2 
 
vulnerabilities of cognitive processes date back to at least the time of Ancient Greece 
when orators used the method of loci (associating items with places in the environment) 
to deliver long speeches from memory. Then and now, people actively use mnemonic 
devices because they are aware of memory’s vulnerabilities and are also aware of the 
benefits mnemonic devices provide to scaffold, or augment normal cognitive 
capabilities.  
Metacognition has been a topic of interest and research throughout the history of 
modern psychology. For example, Wilhelm Wundt wrote about metacognition even 
though his research goals were not related to metacognition per se. He wrote that “In 
psychology, the person looks upon himself as from within and tries to explain the 
interrelations of those processes that this internal observation discloses” (Wundt, 1873). 
Hermann Ebbinghaus knew that using existing words in his memory experiments could 
confound the results and thus he strategically chose to use nonsense syllables to remove 
the contamination of previous experience on new learning (Fuchs & Milar, 2003). More 
examples of interest in metacognition can be found throughout the history of 
psychology. Of course, research and theory on metacognition has made significant 
progress since the time of Ancient Greece and early German psychology.  
 Today, research in metacognition is wide-ranging. From judgments-of-learning 
(Leonesio & Nelson, 1990), to reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981), to source 
monitoring (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), to feeling-of-knowing judgments 
(Hart, 1965), to second-order judgments (Dunlosky, Serra, Matvey, & Rawson, 2005), 
and more; there are literally thousands of examples of research studies with the express 
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purpose of investigating some aspect of metacognition. The whole spectrum of research 
in metacognition is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, I will focus on one 
niche of metacognitive research, that is, ways in which researchers have attempted to 
improve individuals’ metacognitive ability and allocation of study time. I will first 
describe theories of metacognition, methods to measure metacognition, the neurological 
bases of metacognition, and systematic distortions in metacognition.  
1.1  Theories of metacognition 
 Although clearly people were aware of metacognition and were studying the 
concept earlier, it was not defined as we know it today until 1979 when John Flavell 
defined metacognition as “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena” (p. 
906). Flavell was a developmental psychologist who was responsible for some of the 
first studies of metamemory in children (e.g., Flavell, Friedrichs, & Hoyt, 1970). In 
1979, he outlined four classes of phenomena that make up metacognition. The four 
classes he outlined were 1) metacognitive knowledge, which allows an individual to 
compare his or her own cognitive abilities to others’ cognitive abilities, 2) metacognitive 
experience, which includes the “sudden feeling that you do not understand something 
another person just said,” 3) goals or tasks which refer to “the objectives of cognitive 
enterprise”, and 4) actions or strategies which refer to the type(s) of cognitive activity 
that will be used to reach the goals (pgs. 906-908). A later definition of metacognition 
according to Dunlosky and Metcalfe (2009) is somewhat more expansive. They wrote 
that metacognition involves “any reflection or judgment made upon an internal 
representation” (pg. 145, emphasis is the authors’).  
4 
 
 Flavell (1979) described the first theory of metacognition in the modern era and 
went on to present a slightly modified system almost a decade later (Flavell, 1987). In 
that system, Flavell elaborated on the key concepts of his metacognitive taxonomy. He 
wrote that within metacognitive knowledge there were person, task, and strategy 
variables that all provide some information to the metacognitive observer (i.e., the 
individual). Interestingly, he wrote about his awareness that his taxonomy of 
metacognition was insufficient and that “deeply insightful,” “detailed proposals” have 
yet to be proposed (p. 28). In the same volume, Brown (1987) provided an assessment of 
metacognition as a concept and as an area of study more than a decade on. In her review 
of the existing literature at the time, Brown questioned whether the diversity of research 
areas claiming to be metacognition should in fact be under the metacognition heading. 
As Flavell predicted, these theories are seen as mostly descriptive and problematic in 
terms of generating testable hypotheses for later research.  
 One theory of metacognition that has generated a significant amount of research 
and is now widely accepted was proposed by Nelson and Narens (1990) and has three 
critical features. First, it assumes that individuals are self-reflective and that they model 
their environment. Second, their theory splits cognitive processes into two interrelated 
parts, one is the object-level (e.g., memory) and the other is the meta-level. The 
individual’s meta-level contains a model of the cognitive process. Third, their system 
requires a dominance scheme in communication such that the meta-level is informed by 
the object-level, via monitoring, and the meta-level acts on the object-level, via control 
processes. In other words, information about cognitive activity feeds forward into the 
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individual’s meta-level and this information allows the individual to monitor their 
cognitive activity. Once the person’s meta-level of cognitive activity is updated it is 
compared to an ideal state, which is known as the model. From there, through control or 
regulatory processes, the person’s meta-level modifies the object-level depending on the 
how the current state of activity compares to the model state. The modification could 
include initiating an action, continuing an action or terminating an action. From the 
previous example, the student attempting to memorize the bones of the human body, as 
the student attempts to memorize the bones, the meta-level receives information about 
the ongoing cognitive activity through monitoring and makes comparisons to the model. 
Based on these comparisons, the student is able to control their study by initiating a 
different kind of study strategy, continuing or discontinuing study.   
 Nelson and Narens’ model of metacognition does not presuppose that monitoring 
processes provide veridical accounts of object-level activity. In fact, the exact 
mechanism by which individuals monitor object-level activity has yet to be determined. 
Two classes of mechanisms, the direct-access view and inferential views have been 
offered. In the direct-access view, individuals make monitoring judgments based on 
features of the target(s) that they can access (Schwartz, 1994). In contrast, the inferential 
view of monitoring processes maintains that cues and heuristics guide monitoring 
judgments (Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1992). For example, if a person studied a Swahili-
English word pair, and was asked to indicate the likelihood of remembering the English 
word given the Swahili word as the cue, that person would base their judgment on their 
familiarity with the cue. There are other examples of the inferential view of monitoring 
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processes (e.g., the accessibility hypothesis; Koriat, 1993). Evidence has supported both 
views and it is most likely that monitoring processes are served by both mechanisms 
(Metcalfe, 1999). One study suggests that direct-access mechanisms may take 
precedence during encoding and inferential mechanisms take precedence during retrieval 
(Schwartz). Furthermore, other mechanisms, that have yet to be identified, could better 
characterize how individuals make monitoring judgments.  
1.1.1  Summary  
Not everyone is in agreement about a complete theory of metacognition, one that 
encompasses the diversity of research in the area. Indeed, metacognition as an area of 
research has been criticized on this point (Brown, 1987; Schraw, 2000). Fortunately 
there are commonalities among many theories of metacognition and agreement among 
most researchers about the main components of metacognition. These broad areas of 
agreement, namely monitoring and control, are exemplified in the Nelson and Narens 
(1990) model of metacognition and research has supported the monitoring and control 
distinction (Nelson, Dunlosky, Graf, & Narens, 1994).  
1.2  Methods to measure metacognition 
 Because the Nelson and Narens’ (1990) framework of metacognition is so well 
accepted it is useful to think about the variety of methods to measure metacognition and 
how the processes involved correspond to monitoring and control during acquisition, 
retention, and retrieval stages of cognition. Multiple methods to measure metacognition 
have been identified during acquisition and retrieval. Methods to measure metacognition 
during retention are scarcer.  
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1.2.1  Measuring metacognitive monitoring  
Even in advance of learning, an individual can make metacognitive judgments. 
From the previous example, the student could make a monitoring judgment to determine 
how easy or difficult she believes memorizing the entire list of bones will be; this is 
known as an ease-of-learning (EOL) judgment (Underwood, 1966). During on-going 
learning, while she attempts to memorize the bones, she could make item-by-item 
judgments of learning (JOLs), in which she determines how well she believes she has 
learned the information. 
 Another type of monitoring judgment one can make that is similar to a JOL is a 
performance prediction. In both instances, with JOLs and performance predictions, a 
person attempts to evaluate how well they have learned something. A major point of 
distinction is the goal of the assessment. In the case of a JOL, the assessment is an end in 
itself. In contrast, with a performance prediction, the person not only makes a JOL, but 
that person also has to translate the JOL into a prediction about how about well they will 
perform on an upcoming test. Therefore, dissociations could exist between these JOLS 
and performance predictions when information about the test influences performance 
predictions but not JOLs (c.f. Miller and Geraci, 2011a). 
 When it comes to retrieving the bones of the human body on the test, the student 
can make a source-monitoring judgment, in which she attempts to remember the context 
or source of information for that particular fact (Johnson et al., 1993). The source of 
one’s memory—did the professor describe the bone in class or did a student in her study 
group describe the bone—is important for evaluating the reliability of the information. 
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Following a response, the student could determine her confidence that the response she 
made is correct; these judgments are known as retrospective confidence judgments 
(Lichtenstein, Fischoff, & Phillips, 1982). Moreover, a person could also make a 
postdiction by indicating after the exam if she believed the response she made was 
accurate (c.f., Pierce and Smith, 2001). Results from studies on postdictions have shown 
that postdictions are significantly more accurate than predictions. If the student is not 
able to remember an answer, she could be prompted to make a feeling-of-knowing 
judgment (FOK). An affirmative FOK indicates that the person is sure they could 
recognize the correct answer if provided with a list of possible answers (Hart, 1965). 
 Another measurement theme is whether to use relative and/or absolute accuracy 
measures. When people make monitoring judgments on an item-by-item basis, relative 
accuracy or resolution is measured by computing a correlation coefficient, typically a 
Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation (Nelson, 1984). In contrast, when people make 
monitoring judgments about a large number of items, absolute accuracy or calibration is 
measured by the degree to which the prediction corresponds to the actual level of 
performance by creating a calibration curve (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009).  
 Relative and absolute monitoring accuracy represent different dependent 
variables. For example, in an experiment using a measure of relative accuracy, a 
participant assigns a JOL to a specific item and the question is whether or not items that 
received high JOLs were recalled with a greater probability than items receiving lower 
JOLs? If so, the participant is said to have high resolution. In contrast, for absolute 
accuracy, a person has accurate calibration if their actual recall level matched their JOL. 
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To clarify these two measures, consider a situation in which a participants assigns a 
particular item an 80% JOL. For relative accuracy, the question is whether or not that 
item is recalled more often than an item given a lower JOL (e.g., 20%). If the same 
person provided an 80% JOL for the entire list of items, the question for absolute 
accuracy would be whether or not the person recalled 80% of the items. Two related 
measurement themes in metacognitive accuracy are global and local monitoring 
accuracy. In a study by Nietfeld, Cao, and Osborne (2005), participants made item-by-
item confidence judgments about the accuracy of their answer, what the authors referred 
to as local monitoring judgments, and they made overall confidence judgments about 
their accuracy on the entire test, referred to as global monitoring judgments. The authors 
then averaged the local monitoring judgments and compared them to the global 
judgments. On three different exams, the global monitoring judgments were more 
accurate than the local judgments.  
1.2.2  Measuring metacognitive control  
Much of the research into how individuals control metacognitive processes uses 
item selection for restudy and, by extension, which items to quit studying. This research 
has compared two distinct theories of item selection – the discrepancy-reduction model 
and the region-of-proximal learning model (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998; Metcalfe & 
Kornell, 2005). In the discrepancy-reduction model, the learner has a goal in mind, 
known as the norm-of-study. For example, if the norm-of-study was mastery, the learner 
would continue studying items until she believed that the she had memorized all of the 
material. In other words, the goal of study is to reduce the discrepancy between what is 
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known and what the norm-of-study happens to be (Dunlosky & Hertzog). This model 
does not specify the order of item-selection for further study. In contrast, the region-of-
proximal learning model of study-time allocation states that, items that remain for 
further study will be prioritized from the subjectively easiest to the hardest. This latter 
model also accounts for how learners terminate study – so long as the learner believes 
they are learning they will continue study (Metcalfe & Kornell).  
 Learners can also use metacognitive control at retrieval. One way in which 
learners control their retrieval is by deciding what answers to report and what answers to 
withhold. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) manipulated the incentives in a forced-choice or 
free-report memory test. In the moderate-incentive condition, correctly recalling an item 
was worth the same as the penalty for reporting an incorrect item, about $0.50. In the 
high-incentive condition, the penalty for false alarms ($5.00) was much larger than the 
incentive for correct recall ($0.50). The incentive manipulation had a measurable impact 
on the quantity of items participants reported in the free-report test format. That is, the 
quantity of recall in the high incentive/high penalty condition was significantly reduced 
relative to the free-report test format, which indicated that participants were able to 
effectively withhold low-confidence answers. Furthermore, participants’ tendency to 
report an item was highly correlated with their subjective confidence that they had 
learned the item.  
1.2.3  Summary  
Measurements in metacognition are differentiated by when they occur in the 
acquisition, retention, retrieval stages of cognition and also by what process they reflect 
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– either monitoring or control processes. One method that has been used extensively is 
the judgment-of- learning (JOL). JOLs can be made by participants on an item-by-item 
basis and are assessed by correlating the JOL with recall or JOLs can be made by 
participants on a global basis and can be assessed by calculating the difference between 
the prediction and the performance. The numerous methods for measuring monitoring 
(e.g., EOLs, JOLs, and FOKs) and control (item selection) are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation but as described, one type of judgment affects the other. The 
interconnectedness of metacognitive monitoring and control cannot be emphasized 
enough. Indeed, Brown (1987) remarked that a source of confusion and tension among 
researchers who study metacognition are the attempts to separate the two processes.  
1.3  Neurological bases of metacognition 
 Recently, researchers have attempted to identify the neural correlates of 
metacognitive processes. Research using imaging techniques has allowed researchers to 
gain a better understanding of the brain areas that are associated with metacognitive 
processes. Because of the top-down control processes associated with metacognition and 
its similarities to executive control, the frontal lobes seemed to be a good candidate 
location for metacognition. Indeed, the results from the overwhelming majority of 
studies indicate areas in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) as being associated with 
metacognition (Pannu & Kasniak, 2005; Schwartz & Bacon, 2008). Other research with 
special and patient populations has examined the influence of aging and different types 
of brain injury on metacognitive processes. Other studies have examined the influence of 
drugs on metacognition.   
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 Very few studies measuring metacognitive processes have used imaging 
techniques. Those that have, indicate the important role of areas in the PFC for accurate 
metacognitive monitoring. In one such study, participants were asked to view pictures 
and predict future memory performance by making a 2-choice JOL (i.e., will recognize 
or will-not recognize) while event-related fMRI data were collected (Kao, Davis, & 
Gabrieli, 2005). The fact that brain activity was measured during learning is an 
important component of this experiment because brain activity would likely be different 
if it were measured following learning but at the same time JOLs were made. Following 
learning and after making a JOL, participants took a recognition test. There were four 
main conclusions from the study relating to predicted and actual encoding success. First, 
although medial temporal lobe activity was associated with encoding success (correctly 
recognizing the item at test), it was not associated with predicted encoding success. 
Therefore, the MTL area does not support the individual making JOLs. Second, medial 
pre-frontal cortex (PFC) activity was associated with JOL processing, that is, when a 
participant reported they would recognize a scene later, areas in the PFC were active. 
Third, individuals with greater ventro-medial PFC activity reported more accurate JOLs 
than those with less activity in that region. Finally, actual encoding success and 
predicted encoding success, JOL accuracy, was associated with lateral PFC activity.  
 Another interesting metacognitive process that could be occurring before 
conscious awareness is an event-related brain potential known as the error-related 
negativity (ERN). When a participant commits an error on a trial in a Stroop or Flanker 
task paradigm, a negative-going brain potential occurs approximately 100ms after the 
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response (e.g., Gehring & Fencsik, 2001; Luu, Flaisch, & Tucker, 2000). Topographical 
maps of electroencephalogram (EEG) activity consistently highlight the frontal lobe as 
the area most active during the ERN, but the signal originates in the anterior cingulate 
cortex (Simons, 2010). Error trials and correct trials are not differentiated by EEG 
activity among individuals with damage to the lateral PFC, a finding that is consistent 
with research indicating the importance of this area for metacognitive processing (Kao et 
al., 2005).  
 Individual differences in brain structure among healthy participants are also 
correlated with metacognitive ability. For example, (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & 
Rees, 2010) found that introspective accuracy on a perceptual task correlated with gray 
matter volume and white matter microstructure in the anterior prefrontal cortex. 
Individuals with more volume were more aware of their success and failures leading the 
researchers to suggest “a central role for anterior and dorsolateral PFC in metacognitive 
sensitivity” (Fleming et al., p. 1543).   
 More recently, repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) has been used 
to support the connection between areas in the PFC and accurate monitoring (Rounis, 
Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, Lau, 2010). Although this study used a slightly 
idiosyncratic monitoring paradigm in the visual domain, it remains the only rTMS 
experiment investigating metacognitive processes that this author is aware of. 
Participants in the experiment were required to identify the spatial location of two 
objects on a computer screen and to report the visibility of the objects as either “clear” or 
“unclear.” Participants completed the task at baseline and after a session of bi-lateral 
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theta-burst stimulation (TBS) to areas in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to 
depress cortical activity in that area. The results indicated that even though participants 
could complete the task as well after the rTMS as they had before rTMS, participants’ 
self-reported visibility – the metacognitive judgment – decreased after rTMS. In other 
words, participants were not as metacognitively aware of their performance after rTMS 
as they were before the procedure.  
 There are also studies examining metacognitive processes in special populations. 
In one study, Hertzog, Sinclair, and Dunlosky (2010) collected and compared JOL 
resolution for paired-associate items from participants of all ages (ages 18-81). Their 
regression analyses revealed a significant increase in resolution across the lifespan; older 
adults were more likely to exhibit monitoring accuracy than younger adults. Importantly, 
there was also a significant decline in overall recall performance with age. Therefore, 
better monitoring accuracy of older adults was a result of a reduction in reported JOLs 
over time. In contrast, other studies have indicated that younger and older adults have 
equivalent JOL resolution (e.g., Hertzog, Kidder, Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002). 
The different conclusion from  the previous two studies, with one study indicating older 
adults have superior monitoring ability and the other indicating equivalent monitoring, 
could be a result of the older adult sample used. The older adult sample used in Hertzog 
et al. (2010) was a full cross-sectional sample, meaning all ages were represented 
whereas Hertzog et al. (2002) used an extreme age-groups cross sectional design. 
Another possible source of the discrepancy is the type of list-learning participants 
engaged in – participants either used mnemonic devices (i.e., interactive imagery) while 
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learning the words (Hertzog et al., 2010) or the relatedness of the words was 
manipulated (Hertzog et al., 2002). A common finding of the two studies though is that 
monitoring accuracy does not decline with age. In light of typical declines in cognitive 
abilities across the lifespan (Salthouse, 2004; Singh-Manoux et al. 2011), these results 
and others (e.g., Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997), indicate that metacognitive 
ability is spared with age. Even older university-aged students are less likely than their 
younger counterparts to be overconfident (Grimes, 2002). In fact, older adults’ spared 
monitoring abilities have been used as one way to improve test performance (Dunlosky, 
Kubat-Silman, & Hertzog, 2003). Older adult participants who were taught to regulate 
their study by identifying less well-learned items, a monitoring process, in order to 
restudy them were more likely to have improved memory test performance compared to 
control groups who used other study strategies or no strategies at all (Dunlosky et al., 
2003; see also Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011).  
 Pharmacologic manipulations and assessments of monitoring ability in other 
situations corroborate the robustness of metacognitive processes in healthy individuals. 
For example, in one study participants inhaled nitrous-oxide (N2O) during study of 
paired associates and were asked to make item-by-item JOLs (Dunlosky, Domoto, 
Wang, Ishikawa, Roberson, Nelson, & Ramsay, 1998). N20 was used because it has a 
clear detrimental effect on learning and memory and because its influence is temporary. 
Analysis of relative and absolute accuracy of participants’ JOLs indicated that even 
though overall recall performance was low relative to a placebo group, N2O inhalation 
did not inhibit accurate monitoring for immediate or delayed JOLs. A similar pattern of 
16 
 
results is observed for metacognitive accuracy under alcohol intoxication. That is, even 
when participants were under the influence, metacognitive processes were intact 
(Nelson, McSpadden, Fromme, Marlatt, 1986).  
 In contrast to the robustness of metacognition shown in some pharmacologic 
research, other research suggests that metacognitive processes are vulnerable to brain 
damage and hypoxia. For example, patients with dementia of the Alzheimer’s disease 
type have frontal-executive impairments and often the earliest symptom of these deficits 
is the lack of insight into their impaired abilities (Mendez & Cummings, 2003). The 
argument that AD patients have little to no metacognition has been challenged though. 
For example, Moulin (2002) argued that traditional accuracy measures indicate AD 
patients have severely impaired metacognition. But sensitivity measures, which measure 
ongoing metacognitive processes during encoding, indicate AD patients do in fact 
exhibit metacognitive processes. Patients with vascular dementia have relatively 
preserved insight (Mendez & Cummings). This dissociation in awareness would likely 
be explained by the differences in neuronal cell death in Alzheimer’s disease versus 
vascular dementia. Whereas neocortical frontal lobe atrophy is common in Alzheimer’s 
disease (Salat, Kaye, & Janowsky, 2001) and even in frontotemporal dementia (FTD), 
frontal lobe atrophy is not always present in vascular dementia.   
 The fidelity of metacognitive processes also suffers in oxygen deficient states. 
Oxygen deficiency, or hypoxia, is a well-known problem for humans at altitude. One 
study examined the effects of hypoxia on metacognitive processes at various stages of a 
trek to the summit of Mt. Everest – in Kathmandu, at base-camp before ascent, at 6,500 
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or 7,100 m, at base-camp after ascent, and again in Kathmandu (Nelson, Dunlosky, 
White, Steinberg, Townes, & Anderson, 1990).  Participants attempted to answer 34 
general knowledge questions from the FACTRETRIEVAL2 battery (Wilkinson & 
Nelson, 1984). An example of the general knowledge question in the battery was “What 
is the capital of Finland? (Helsinki)” For items participants could not answer, they made 
feeling-of-knowing judgments and selected responses from an 8-item multiple choice 
format recognition test. Participants’ recall at the testing locations was not different, 
however participants’ mean FOK judgments were. Participants reported lower FOK 
judgments at the 3 highest altitudes even when the accuracy of recognition (after the 
failed recall attempt) did not differ between altitudes.   
1.3.1  Summary  
The quantity of research using imaging techniques to investigate aspects of 
metacognition is limited; however, there is some consensus among the research findings 
that are available. At least during study, areas in the brain that support metacognitive 
processes (i.e., JOLs) are located in the ventro- and dorso- medial PFC and some 
individual differences can be accounted for by activation in the ventro-medial PFC (Kao 
et al. 2005). Furthermore, the left lateral PFC is highly associated with accurate JOLs. 
Repetitive-TMS corroborates these latter findings by indicating that a depressed activity 
in the dorso-lateral PFC inhibits accurate metacognitive judgments. Research with 
patient populations, like those with dementia, corroborates these findings and suggests 
that damage to the frontal (and the temporal lobe in the case of FTD) impairs 
metacognitive processes. Moreover, a hypoxic environment, like one might find on Mt. 
18 
 
Everest, has clear effect on metacognitive monitoring. On the other hand, some 
pharamacologic manipulations (e.g., N20 inhalation) and research with healthy older 
adults suggests that metacognitive processes are robust.  
1.4  Systematic distortions in metacognitive monitoring 
 Although metacognitive processes can be robust into late adulthood and under 
unusual circumstances, the general sentiment about the accuracy of metacognitive 
monitoring in healthy individuals is that they are merely at above-chance accuracy – far 
from perfect. It is it useful to think about ways in which metacognitive processes are 
inaccurate. Countless studies show that people make inaccurate self-assessments. When 
people are asked to predict their future performance on a test, when they are asked to 
predict how long a task will take to complete, or even when they are asked to describe 
their driving skills, their assessments are inaccurate. And there are several systematic 
distortions, or cognitive biases that can explain these monitoring errors. The focus for 
the remainder of this section will be on one distortion, overconfidence, which is seen 
extensively, both in the research literature and in naturalistic settings. 
 Overconfidence, or sometimes referred to as the better-than-average effect 
(Alicke, 1985), is one of the most widely studied distortions in metacognitive research. 
Research indicates that more often than not, it is the lowest performers that are the most 
overconfident (e.g., Bol, Hacker, O’Shea & Allen 2005; Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 
2006, Hacker, Bol, Horgan, & Rakow, 2000; Kelemen, Winningham & Weaver, 2007; 
Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Krueger & Mueller, 2002; Miller & Geraci, 2011b.) For 
example, low performers on a given test think they have learned the information much 
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better than they actually have and so they predict that they will perform better on the test 
than they actually do. 
 Much research has been completed to determine why low performers are 
overconfident. One provocative idea is that low performers suffer from a “double curse,”  
which is the idea that low performers not only struggle with learning the material they 
will be tested on, they also do not know that they are struggling and they make overly 
optimistic metacognitive judgments (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). It follows from the 
double-curse account that if low performers lack knowledge and awareness then, in 
addition to making inaccurate performance predictions, they would also be unduly 
confident in these predictions. Indeed, Dunning (2005) likened low performers’ inflated 
self-assessments to a form of brain damage (i.e., anosognosia), and suggested that 
“people performing poorly cannot be expected to recognize their ineptitude” and that 
“the ability to recognize the depth of their inadequacies is beyond them” (pg. 15). 
 The double-curse characterization of low performers’ inaccuracy has been 
challenged though.  One study in particular examined whether low performers were 
entirely unaware of their deficits (Miller & Geraci, 2011c). To answer this question, we 
measured metacognition using what some people have referred to as a meta-meta 
judgment. We asked participants to predict their upcoming performance and also to 
indicate the confidence they had that the prediction was accurate. The judgments we 
asked participants to make highlights the distinction between two forms of confidence. 
Herein, we refer to errors of overestimating one’s ability – predicting that one will 
perform better than they do as functional overconfidence and errors of overcertainty – 
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being overly certain of one’s predictions as subjective overconfidence. Measuring 
subjective confidence has limited precedence in the literature. As far as I am aware, 
there is only one study that has examined subjective confidence associated with 
predictions of performance (Dunlosky et al., 2005). In this study, participants made 
JOLs to indicate the likelihood that they would remember unrelated noun pairs. For each 
JOL, participants made a second-order judgment (SOJ) indicating their confidence in the 
JOL. Results showed that JOLs and SOJs were functionally distinct from each other, 
displaying a U-shaped curvilinear relationship with higher SOJs at extreme JOLs. In 
addition the curve was asymmetrical, showing that SOJs associated with high JOLs were 
much greater than SOJs associated with low JOLs. 
 Returning to a description of the Miller and Geraci (2011c) study, results showed 
the standard effect for low performers; that is, low performers predicted that they would 
perform much better than they actually performed.  Thus, low performers were 
functionally overconfident. But, interestingly, low performers were subjectively 
underconfident relative to high performers in that they were less confident that their 
predictions were accurate. In two studies on three different exams, there was a consistent 
dissociation between functional and subjective overconfidence. We found this 
dissociation regardless of whether participants predicted their scores as a letter grade or 
as a percentage, whether participants could earn incentives for accuracy or not, and 
regardless of whether their predictions were for the first exam or the final exam in the 
course. The fact that low performing students were less subjectively confident in their 
predictions than high performing students supports the notion that low performing 
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students may have some awareness of their ineptitude. Furthermore, this pattern of data 
provides evidence against the strongest version of the double curse account, which 
suggests that low performers overestimate performance because they are unaware of 
their lack of metacognitive knowledge (see Kruger & Dunning, 1999).  
 Given the conclusion that low performers might have some awareness of their 
metacognitive errors, one might ask: Why do low performers consistently exhibit more 
metacognitive errors than high performers? Some hypotheses about this discrepancy are 
that low performers are motivated to be overconfident (Gramzow, Willard, & Mendes, 
2008), that it is a result of attributional style (Hacker, Bol, & Bahbahani, 2008a), that 
they wish to “look good” to an experimenter (Ehrlinger, Johnson, Banner, Dunning, & 
Kruger, 2008), or that perhaps it is simply an issue of flawed reasoning about the content 
of the upcoming test (Miller & Geraci, 2011a). Other possibilities are that low 
performers engage in the “wrong” kinds of study behaviors (e.g., highlighting, re-
reading, etc.), which then may lead to overconfidence, or that the overconfidence is 
merely a measurement artifact (Krueger & Mueller, 2002).  
 Gramzow and colleagues (2008) argued that there could be adaptive benefits to 
overestimation because it serves to encourage future behavior. Participants in the study 
were interviewed about their academic performance while autonomic nervous system 
activity was also measured. One measure, respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) is an 
indicator of cardiac vagal tone, or more specifically heart rate acceleration and 
deceleration during the respiratory cycle. Low RSA versus high RSA suggests negative 
emotionality like anxiety. The results indicated that those who exaggerated their grade 
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point average (GPA) did not exhibit low RSA which, is a typical cardiovascular reaction 
of lying. In fact, RSA for participants who exaggerated their GPA the most actually 
increased during the interview. This finding, led the authors to suggest exaggerators’ 
equanimity while they “lied” about their academic history may be adaptive. Moreover, 
increased RSA during the interview was significantly positively correlated with GPA 
improvement (Gramzow et al., 2008).  
 Others have examined students’ attributions for monitoring inaccuracy (Hacker 
et al., 2008a). After participants had taken the exam for which they made performance 
predictions, they were told how inaccurate their predictions were. Then, all participants 
completed an attributional style questionnaire that included task-centered questions (e.g., 
“The instruction wasn’t really helpful in preparing us for the test”), student-centered 
testing questions(“I usually get really anxious while taking tests”), student-centered 
studying questions (“I didn’t study as much as I should have”), and social-centered 
questions (“My interactions with other students in class influenced my judgments”). 
Participants answered each of the 20 questions on a 5-point Likert scale with the degree 
to which they believed the question explained the discrepancy between their 
performance prediction and their actual performance. Results indicated that low-
performing students, who also made overconfident performance predictions, attributed 
the discrepancy between their prediction and actual performance to external factors (e.g., 
“The instruction wasn’t really helpful in preparing us for the test.”) significantly more so 
than high-performing students.  
23 
 
 Another reason participants might remain overconfident is because they wish to 
“look good” in front of the experimenter. To circumvent this potential confound, 
researchers have provided monetary incentives to increase metacognitive accuracy 
(Ehrlinger et al., 2008). Participants were contestants in a trap and skeet competition. 
Participants in the experimental (incentive) condition were offered double their money, 
from $5.00 to $10.00, if they gave accurate predictions on a gun safety test. Control 
condition participants received no such incentive, just the $5.00 base for participation. 
Overall, participants’ accuracy did not improve when they were given incentives to be 
accurate and surprisingly, the low performers on the safety test actually became more 
overconfident in the incentive condition whereas the high performers slightly 
recalibrated. Questioning whether $10.00 was enough for participants to set aside self-
presentation concerns, the researchers also offered undergraduate participants up to $100 
for predictive accuracy on a logical reasoning task. Still, the monetary incentive had no 
influence on predictions for high or low performers.   
 Another source of metacognitive inaccuracy, typically overconfidence, could be 
an individuals’ understanding about what will be on the test (Miller & Geraci, 2011a). 
Students in the classroom are aware that only a portion of the course material will be 
tested on the exam. Believing that only a portion of the course material can be tested 
may influence students to study less for less time than if they thought all of the material 
would be tested. In a recent study, we asked participants to study Swahili-English 
paired-associates in a self-paced situation and told them that either 25% of the material 
would be tested or 100% of the material would be tested. Results indicated that high-
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performers (defined using their grade point average) were not affected by probability 
information whereas low performers studied significantly less time in the 25% condition 
compared to low performers in the 100% condition. In this case, the metacognitive 
inaccuracy is borne out of a failure to monitor the task appropriately. For example, In the 
extreme case, if a student believes that 50% of the material covered in the course will be 
on an upcoming exam, the student may reason that mastering 50% of the material will 
yield a good score and thus they will make a performance prediction that is likely much 
too high. A second study corroborated the laboratory results showing that low-
performing students reported attempting to know the same amount of material that they 
thought would be tested, whereas high performers attempted to know more than they 
thought would be tested. 
 A statistical artifact account of the overconfidence effect has also been offered 
(Krueger & Mueller, 2002). The authors of this account argued that a regression artifact 
in addition to a better-than-average effect can explain the overconfidence effect without 
relying on cognitive, metacognitive, or motivational theories. But this statistical artifact 
hypothesis of overconfidence was challenged by Kruger and Dunning (2002). For 
example, Krueger and Mueller argued that test unreliability is one determinant of 
miscalibration, but calibration asymmetries (i.e., lower performers are much more 
miscalibrated than high performers) do not disappear when test unreliability is 
controlled. We have also suggested that low performers might not know how they will 
so they just guess an average grade, which is higher than their eventual grade (Miller & 
Geraci, 2011c).  
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So far, the focus has been on the finding that people, and particularly, low 
performers, tend to be overconfident, but there are other systematic distortions that occur 
under specific situations and with certain types of metacognitive judgments. For 
example, occasionally people are underconfident in their abilities, especially after 
practice. The underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) effect occurs when participants 
make JOLs after multiple study opportunities. The participants believe they have not 
learned as much as they actually have and report JOLs that underestimate recall 
performance (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002). Another distortion is the hard-easy 
effect that occurs when retrospective confidence judgments for hard items are 
overestimated and confidence judgments for easy items are underestimated (Lichtenstein 
et al., 1982).  
1.4.1  Summary 
When people monitor their cognitive activity, by making JOLs and other 
judgments, there are several systematic distortions. Some of the distortions include 
overconfidence, the hard-easy effect, and the underconfidence-with-practice effect. But 
the reasons for metacognitive inaccuracy are not totally understood. Clearly, from the 
reasons presented here, there could be multiple sources of metacognitive inaccuracy. 
However, it is fair to conclude that the strongest version of the double-curse explanation 
of low performers’ metacognitive inaccuracy lacks empirical support (Miller & Geraci, 
2011c) as does the statistical artifact account (Kruger & Dunning, 2002). However, 
motivational issues, failures to understand probability information, study strategy use 
and possibly other reasons may contribute to metacognitive inaccuracy.   
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1.5  Methods to improve metacognition 
 Because of the benefits of accurate metacognition and the clear differences that 
exist between individuals’ metacognitive ability in normal populations, researchers have 
attempted to improve or “train” metacognition. These attempts have resulted in varying 
degrees of success. One common outcome that researchers have referred to as the 
“Matthew effect,” which occurs when an intervention designed to benefit low achieving 
students has a greater benefit for high achieving students (Kelemen et al., 2007; Hacker, 
et al., 2000). Although improving metacognitive monitoring alone is theoretically 
interesting, an applied research goal has been to improve monitoring with the goal of 
improving control and future educational outcomes. 
1.5.1  Improving metacognitive monitoring accuracy in the laboratory 
Attempts to improve metacognition in the laboratory have produced mixed 
results. Even before Flavell defined the concept of metacognition, researchers were 
attempting to improve participant’s metacognition by training calibration ability. For 
example, in one early attempt to train metacognition, participants viewed word pairs 
with various encoding tasks (i.e., specifying the word pairs’ relationship as synonyms, 
antonyms, or as unrelated)  and then they were told to rate their confidence that their 
answers on the encoding task were correct on five successive days of sessions (Adams & 
Adams, 1958). Participants in the experimental condition were given feedback after each 
session that indicated the discrepancy between their confidence and performance for 
each item. The control condition was only shown a distribution of their confidence 
judgments. The calibration results indicated that the experimental condition participants 
27 
 
showed moderate improvement from session one to five while control condition 
participants did not.   
 In a slightly different training paradigm, participants read two-choice general 
knowledge questions, answered them, and also rated their confidence that their answer 
was correct in 23 1-hour sessions (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1980). Prior to the first 
session, participants were given detailed information about calibration. Calibration was 
illustrated by provided examples of well-calibrated and poorly-calibrated individuals. 
They were also told the goal of the experiment, which was to determine if calibration 
ability could be improved with multiple sessions. Moreover, after each session, summary 
reports that included each participant’s performance, calibration, resolution and other 
information were given to the participant and explained by the experimenter for up to 
20min. Results of Experiment 1 indicated that the participants began overconfident but 
most were able to improve their calibration; with the majority of the improvement 
occurring between the first and second sessions of feedback.   
 In another study, participants improved their calibration with repeated practice 
without feedback but only for a portion of the participants (Kelemen et al., 2007). In this 
study, participants were instructed to study different Swahili-English word pairs on five 
occasions and to indicate the likelihood that they would remember the English words. 
Results showed that by session 5, participants’ predictions improved significantly 
relative to previous sessions. Therefore in this lab study, repeated practice making 
performance predictions did improve calibration, but importantly, it was only the high 
28 
 
achieving students (as measured by participant’s SAT scores) who were able to increase 
their calibration.   
While the previous two experiments were completed in multiple sessions across 
multiple days, other studies have asked participants to make predictions and postdictions 
over multiple sets of questions, but all in the same session (Pierce & Smith, 2001). A 
main finding of this research indicated that postdictions were significantly more accurate 
than predictions. Another finding that may be more relevant to the current section on 
improving metacognition is that there was no improvement from the first time making 
either monitoring judgments to the final time making the judgments.   
 These previous studies (Adams & Adams, 1958; Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1980; 
Kelemen et al., 2007; and Pierce & Smith, 2001) all included multiple opportunities for 
participants to make monitoring judgments. In the majority of these studies, participants 
made judgments on multiple days. Another, commonality is that most used intense 
practice regimens. Lichtenstein and Fischoff commented that the training involved for 
Experiment 1 of the study was “both arduous and expensive,” so much so that they 
completed a second experiment to determine if similar improvement would be seen with 
a shortened training program, from 23 1-hour sessions down to 11 sessions (pg. 166). 
Similar improvements in monitoring accuracy were also observed with the shortened 
program. Furthermore, at least in two of the three studies that showed improvement, 
intense feedback was involved. But given that Kelemen et al. did not use feedback and 
still showed improvement, the role of feedback cannot be determined. One component of 
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many of the previous studies and some to follow is the role that achievement plays in 
participants’ success or failure in adjusting their performance predictions.  
There are also other methods used to improve metacognitive calibration in the 
laboratory that are more easily accomplished. For example, in the laboratory one easy 
way to improve calibration is to simply increase the time between when the subject 
finishes study and when the prediction, or judgment-of-learning (JOL), is made (Nelson 
& Dunlosky, 1991). This improvement is known as the delayed-JOL effect. In the study 
that identified the accuracy superiority of delayed-JOLs, participants studied paired 
associates and were told that they would take a test 10 minutes after study on the paired 
associates. For half of the paired-associates, participants made an immediate JOL and on 
the other half they made the JOLs more than 30 seconds after studying (in order to 
exceed the length of short-term memory) with some intervening paired associates. 
Calibration, or absolute accuracy, for the delayed-JOLs was significantly better than 
calibration for the immediate JOLs. The authors concluded that delayed JOLs extremely 
accurate, which was in stark contrast to other research on JOLs.  The advantage of 
delayed-JOLs over immediate JOLs has recently been confirmed through a meta-
analysis involving more than 40 studies and more than 100 effect sizes (Rhodes & 
Tauber, 2011). The authors suggested that delaying a JOL confers an advantage over an 
immediate JOL because when participants made the immediate JOL, they were 
monitoring the contents of short-term memory in addition to the contents of long-term 
memory. The authors named this hypothesis the “monitoring-dual-memories principle” 
(MDM). The problem with monitoring the contents of both short- and long-term 
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memory of course is that participants were only able to tap the contents of long-term 
memory at the time of the memory test, therefore monitoring short-term memory adds 
“noise” to the judgment and could be a source of overly optimistic self-assessments 
(Nelson & Dunlosky). The reason delaying making a JOL improves resolution then is 
because the individual making the JOL is able to more accurately monitor the contents 
of long-term memory.   
1.5.2  Improving metacognitive monitoring accuracy in the classroom 
In classroom studies, metacognitive monitoring has proven difficult to modify. In 
a review of the literature,  Hacker, Bol, and Keener (2008b) identified several attempts 
that have been made to improve metacognitive accuracy in the classroom using a variety 
of methods including giving students practice tests, practice making predictions, 
incentives, feedback, training and more. Yet, very few studies achieved their goal of 
improving students’ monitoring accuracy. In one particular classroom study, student 
participants were asked to predict exam scores on each of three mid-term exams and one 
final comprehensive exam (Nietfeld et al., 2005). Students made both local (i.e., item-
by-item) and global (for the entire exam) performance predictions. After each exam, 
students were encouraged to review their predictions, although no feedback or formal 
monitoring training was provided. Results showed that global monitoring was more 
accurate than local monitoring but that both types of monitoring actually decreased from 
exam 1 to 2. Based on the pattern of data, the authors concluded that self-directed 
feedback was not a sufficient intervention to improve students’ metacognitive 
calibration.   
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 Others have tried to improve metacognition in the classroom by providing 
practice and specific types of training on the value of accurate self-assessment. In one 
study, students made prediction and postdictions on each of three different exams 
(Hacker et al., 2000). Students were encouraged to make accurate self-assessments and 
were informed about the value of accurate self-assessments. They also completed 
practice exams prior to each exam to obtain more accurate feedback on the status of their 
knowledge. After the exams they were advised to reflect on their predictions and 
develop a plan to improve their accuracy. Under these conditions, students’ predictions 
improved across exams while postdictions remained stable and consistently more 
accurate than predictions. When students were split into high and low performance 
groups (based on the percentage of total items answered correctly), results showed that 
the prediction improvement was carried by the high-performing students. Notably, even 
though prediction accuracy improved for the high-performing group, overall exam 
performance did not.  
 The authors offered reasons why high- but not low-performing students were 
able to improve their prediction accuracy. First, they suggested that students’ use of 
feedback may vary according to the extent to which they externalize negative outcomes. 
When poor students receive negative feedback about the accuracy of an exam prediction, 
they might either use the feedback to recalibrate or attribute the outcome to an external 
factor such as bad instruction or a poorly constructed exam. Second, the authors 
suggested that the incentive used (motivation to graduate) may have only been effective 
for high-performing students. In a subsequent study, Hacker, Bol, and Bahbahani 
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(2008a) examined the role of attributional style and incentives for accuracy, this time 
providing increased course credit for more accurate judgments. But again, results 
showed that while postdictions improved predictions did not.  
 The reasons why classroom studies have shown that poor students cannot 
improve their metacognitive accuracy are unknown. One possibility is that low 
performing students do not improve their metacognitive accuracy because the nature of 
the feedback was simply too general for them to use. For example, in Hacker and 
colleagues (2008a), participants in the reflection condition were instructed to reflect on 
the accuracy of their judgments after receiving their calibration scores, but poor students 
may not be able to make use of this type of feedback or instruction. To address this 
issue, we attempted to improve metacognitive accuracy and exam performance for low 
and high performing students by providing tangible extra-credit incentives and concrete 
feedback for students. Our hypothesis was that providing immediate and tangible 
incentives in conjunction with concrete and specific feedback regarding how students 
could bring their predictions in line with their performance would lead both high- and 
low-performing students to improve their metacognitive accuracy (Miller & Geraci, 
2011b).  In both studies, participants were asked to make global predictions regarding 
the outcome of 4 different mid-term exams. We examined prediction calibration for each 
exam and whether calibration improved throughout the semester. Note that in previous 
work, improvements from the first exam to the second are not always evaluated for 
methodological reasons (see Hacker et al., 2008a), even though one might expect the 
biggest improvements early in the course (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1980). We also 
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examined whether students’ performance improved. We predicted that giving students 
practice and concrete feedback predicting their own grades would lead them to become 
more proficient at self-monitoring and possibly better students. We also asked students 
to complete a questionnaire at the end of the course to determine whether students were 
using the feedback appropriately and what their general strategies were for incorporating 
the feedback they received.  
 In Study 1 feedback that was provided to students about their prediction accuracy 
was minimal but it served as a baseline for Study 2 in which we used the same extra 
credit incentives for accurate predictions but also provided more explicit, concrete 
feedback to students regarding their prediction accuracy. The common result from both 
studies was that students were overconfident, low-performing students even more so 
than high-performing students. As such, the findings were consistent with the literature 
showing that people are mostly overconfident in their self-assessments (e.g., Dunning, 
Heath, & Suls, 2004; Kelemen et al., 2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). Study 1 showed 
that when students had the opportunity to earn extra credit for accurate predictions and 
were given feedback regarding their performance, they were not able to improve their 
metacognitive calibration. In Study 2, when feedback was made more explicit and 
concrete, low-performing students improved their calibration from exam 1 to exam 2. 
However, we did not see any improvement in exam performance. Post-exam questions 
indicated that students used the feedback appropriately, suggesting that the failure to find 
improved exam performance was not a result of students failing to attend to the 
feedback.  
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 There are even easier ways to improve metacognitive monitoring that have been 
identified in the retrospective confidence literature that could be applied to performance 
predictions in the classroom or JOLs in the laboratory. These simple techniques to 
debias retrospective confidence judgments are known as response-oriented 
modifications. For example, given that low performers are consistently overconfident, 
one method to debias their judgments would be to simply tell them to lower their 
predictions. All that participants are required to do in order to improve their accuracy is 
to artificially downgrade their prediction (Keren, 1990). But these sorts of debiasing 
techniques do not force the individual to think critically about errors in monitoring 
judgments. In contrast, process-oriented modifications, encourage participants to re-
think the way such judgments are made.  As such, the hope is that improvements made 
as a result of process-oriented modifications are likely to persist and generalize to other 
situations whereas response-oriented modifications would not.  
1.5.3  Improving metacognitive monitoring accuracy to improve metacognitive control 
effectiveness 
In order for improved metacognitive monitoring to be useful to the individual in 
applied settings, the improved monitoring must also lead to improved metacognitive 
control. Indeed, one reason accurate metacognitive monitoring is beneficial is because 
monitoring and self-regulated learning are intimately connected such that better 
monitoring leads to more effective control and better performance (Nelson et al., 1994). 
One clear example of this relationship was shown when accurate metacognition was 
associated with better academic performance (Everson & Tobias, 1998). In this study, 
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researchers assessed the monitoring ability of incoming college freshman students and 
compared monitoring ability to their GPA and the end of the semester. In the 
assessment, students were first asked to identify words they knew and did not know from 
a word list and then were asked to take an objective test on the same words. Results 
indicated that most calibrated students also had the best GPAs.   
 Even stronger evidence for the link between accurate monitoring and more 
effective control and improved test performance comes from experimental research. For 
example, Thiede, Anderson, and Therriault (2003) manipulated monitoring accuracy by 
asking participants to generate keywords about expository texts immediately after 
reading, after a 5-min delay or not at all. Afterwards, all participants took a 
comprehension test and then were allowed to self-select and reread texts of their choice; 
rereading was followed by another test. Participants who generated keywords after a 
delay had better monitoring accuracy and were better able to regulate their study by 
choosing and rereading texts appropriately. This improved control also conferred an 
advantage on the test for the high monitoring group. Similarly, Nelson et al. (1994) 
showed that accurate monitoring leads to effective control. In this case, control was 
measured as allocation of study time. Participants studied 36 Swahili-English word pairs 
and made item-level delayed-JOLs following the study period.  Following study and 
JOL trials, 18 (out of 36) of the original items were restudied. The between subjects 
manipulation determined the 18 items that were restudied. Participants either restudied 
the subjectively best-learned items (i.e., the items they had given the highest JOLs), the 
subjectively worst-learned items (the lowest JOLs), the objectively most difficult items 
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(based on normative ratings) or 18 items that the individual participants chose to restudy.  
Following the first restudy session, participants took a memory test on all of the items. 
Following this first cycle, each participant completed another 5 restudy-test trials. An 
important feature of this study is that the 18 items that were selected for restudy 
originally were restudied throughout the session. Because allowing the participants to 
select what items should be restudied led to improved recall, the authors concluded that 
participants’ original JOLs were accurate. Choosing the subjectively worst-learned items 
(the lowest JOLs) was also significantly more effective for guiding participants’ 
allocation of study time and recall performance compared to restudying the normatively 
most difficult items.  
  Others have manipulated monitoring accuracy in the classroom to improve 
performance (Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2006). Participants in the experimental 
classroom were given instructions to complete a monitoring worksheet after each class, 
one class per week for 16 weeks. The purpose of the worksheets was so that participants 
could assess their own understanding of the material, identify concepts they found 
difficult to understand and what they would do to understand these difficult concepts, 
and finally, the worksheet contained three practice questions for students to answer. For 
the three practice items, participants also reported a confidence judgment regarding their 
answer. Participants in the control classroom did not complete these monitoring 
worksheets. The results indicated that performance predictions on the exams became 
more calibrated with time for participants in the experimental condition but not the 
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control condition. Importantly, exam performance also improved for experimental 
condition participants.  
 Another strong piece of evidence linking increased accuracy of monitoring 
judgments to more effective self-regulation of study time and improved test performance 
was completed by Thiede (1999). Participants in this study studied Swahili-English word 
pairs and, after viewing all of the word pairs, made a JOL for each pair. Following the 
JOL, participants took a cued-recall memory test. Participants then reported JOLs for 
each item again and were given the opportunity to restudy as many items as they wanted 
of their choosing. Participants were told that the experiment would end only when all 36 
word-pairs were recalled. Restudy was followed by another memory test. The JOL-
restudy-test cycle was repeated until all 36 word pairs were recalled. The results 
indicated that the participants with the most accurate monitoring (strong positive 
correlation between JOL and recall) and the most effective control (strong negative 
correlation between JOL and restudy) also had the best recall test performance.  
Recent work has also suggests that testing may be a critical factor for learning 
because of the metacognitive information that it can provide. Karpicke and Roediger 
(2008) showed that multiple retrieval opportunities enhanced participants’ long-term 
retention of Swahili-English word pairs. In their study, asking participants to take a test, 
or practice retrieving word meanings from memory, enhanced long-term retention even 
more so than additional study – a finding that is commonly referred to as the “testing 
effect.” The testing effect is relevant here because if students tested themselves while 
they studied for an exam it would provide valuable information about how well they 
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knew the material. Students could then use this information to inform their decisions 
about what material to restudy and what material to discontinue studying (see Dunlosky, 
Rawson, & McDonald, 2002). Unfortunately though, most students do not practice 
retrieval and most are not even aware of the benefits of practice retrieval (Karpicke, 
Butler, & Roediger, 2009). Furthermore, when students are given the option to practice 
retrieval, they most often choose not to (Karpicke, 2009).  
When participants are trained to regulate their study by testing themselves, their 
monitoring and performance improves (Dunlosky et al., 2003). In this study, older 
adults, whose monitoring ability is spared or sometimes better than younger adults, were 
trained over multiple sessions about how to use self-testing or how to use other study 
strategies (i.e., imagery) to help them learn paired-associates. As predicted, the older 
adults who were trained to use self-testing while learning had superior memory 
performance compared to older adults who were trained to use other study strategies 
while learning.     
1.5.4  Summary 
Accurate monitoring is associated with improved educational outcomes, in part 
because accurate monitoring leads to more effective control. Attempts to improve 
monitoring have been carried out in the laboratory and in naturalistic settings. Results 
from both types of studies have yielded mixed results, classroom studies even more so 
than laboratory studies. Although the methods vary and results are mixed there are at 
least a few common themes among most the previous studies. For example, attempts to 
improve metacognition in the classroom represent relatively long interventions. In our 
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study, the intervention involved efforts across an entire college semester (Miller & 
Geraci, 2011b). Other common themes are multiple opportunities to predict 
performance, feedback, and incentives. In contrast, for improved monitoring accuracy to 
occur in the lab, somewhat less intensive methods have been utilized (i.e., delayed-
JOLs). Methods that improve monitoring via delayed-JOLs do so by limiting the focus 
of the judgment to long-term memory (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991).  
1.6  Conclusion 
 Metacognition has been a topic psychologists have been interested in since the 
beginning of experimental psychology in the late 19th century. In fact, given that the 
early Greek orators were aware of the limitations of their cognitive process, one could 
say that metacognition is an ancient topic. Today there are countless research areas in 
metacognition. In the area of metacognitive predictions about future performance, 
Nelson and Narens’ (1990) theory of metacognition implied that an individual’s 
metacognitive control can only be effective when the information it receives via 
monitoring processes is accurate. And research has indicated that more accurate 
monitoring leads to more effective control (e.g., Thiede et al., 2003). Unfortunately, 
many people’s monitoring accuracy is biased (e.g., Alicke, 1985; Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1994; Burson et al., 2006; Kelemen et al., 2007; Knouse, Bagwell, Barkley, & 
Murphy, 2005; and others). Some have even claimed that overconfident low performers 
suffer a double-curse, or that their behavior is akin to individuals with brain damage 
(Dunning, 2005, Kruger & Dunning, 1999). More often than not, poor self-regulation 
leads to deficient performance, as in the case above, poor regulation of study behavior 
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leads to poor academic performance (cf. Everson & Tobias, 1998). Of course the 
opposite scenario is also true; people who have accurate metacognitive monitoring are 
better equipped to control their study which then leads to improved performance (Nelson 
et al., 1994, Thiede et al., 2003).  
 Because of the link between accurate monitoring, effective control, and improved 
performance, many researchers have attempted to improve the first link in the causal 
chain. That is, researchers have attempted to improve metacognitive monitoring with the 
hope that doing so would also benefit control and performance (Hacker et al., 2000; 
Nietfeld et al., 2006; and others). However, laboratory and classroom studies have 
indicated that metacognitive monitoring is resistant to intervention (e.g., Lichtenstein & 
Fischoff, 1980; Miller & Geraci, 2011b). Two factors that appear to influence 
monitoring positively are multiple opportunities to make monitoring judgments over 
long periods of time with explicit feedback (Miller & Geraci). Incentives for accuracy 
and instructions for participants to reflect on their judgments have led to mixed results 
(Hacker et al., 2008a). More recently, Miller and Geraci (2011c) showed that even 
though low performers’ monitoring judgments are less accurate than high performers, 
they have some awareness that their predictions are inaccurate. Low performer’s 
awareness of their inaccuracy reveals a possibility for improving metacognition that has 
yet to be tested – whether or not participants can use subjective confidence as a guide to 
recalibrate and improve their metacognitive judgments.  
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2. EXPERIMENTS 
 
 Nelson and Narens’ (1990) theory of metacognition implied that the quality of 
metacognitive control is contingent on the quality of metacognitive monitoring 
processes. Research has indicated that more accurate monitoring leads to more effective 
control (e.g., Thiede et al., 2003). The purpose of current research is to examine whether 
participants can use confidence in their predictions to recalibrate subsequent 
performance predictions. The purpose of Experiment 1 was to establish that 
metacognitive monitoring improvement could be accomplished using subjective 
confidence as a guide.  To do this, participants made performance predictions about an 
upcoming memory test and reported their confidence that the prediction was accurate. 
Participants then adjusted their performance predictions so that they could be more 
confident their prediction was accurate. Calibration in this condition was compared to 
calibration in the control condition in which participants did not rate their confidence in 
their predictions—they simply made the prediction twice. The purpose of Experiment 2 
was to determine if continuous improvement in performance predictions was possible by 
using subjective confidence as a guide. That is, not just improvement from the first to 
second prediction but from the second to third and so on. Participants adjusted their 
performance prediction 3 times – each time indicating their level of confidence that their 
prediction was accurate. Calibration in this condition was compared to calibration in a 
control condition in which participants made repeated predictions but did not indicate 
confidence in these predictions. And finally, the purpose of Experiment 3 was to 
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examine whether participants’ improved performance predictions would also influence, 
and improve, control of study time and performance. Participants studied paired 
associates with the goal of remembering at least 15 out of 20. Following study, 
participants made predictions about future memory performance and rated their 
confidence that the prediction was accurate. Then participants made the decision to 
restudy the items or take the memory test. The total number of times and total time 
participants chose to study the paired associates in this condition was compared to the 
control condition where participants made predictions about future memory performance 
but did not rate confidence.   
2.1  Experiment 1 – improving monitoring accuracy 
 Experiment 1 was designed to serve as proof of concept – to examine whether or 
not participants could use subjective confidence reports as a guide to recalibrate 
performance predictions.   
2.1.1  Method 
 Design.  Experiment 1 used a 2 Condition (Experimental and Control) X 2 
Performance Prediction (Original and Adjusted1) mixed randomized repeated model. 
Condition was the randomized between subjects independent variable and Performance 
Prediction was the repeated measures independent variable. The dependent variable of 
interest was calibration score for the original performance prediction and the adjusted 
performance prediction.  Calibration was calculated by subtracting recall performance 
from prediction. As such, positive values indicated overconfidence and negative values 
indicate underconfidence. Other variables, including demographic variables and 
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vocabulary ability were also measured using the Shipley vocabulary test (Zachary, 
1986). 
 Participants. Participants were 172 undergraduate students from Texas A&M 
University who participated for partial course credit. The sample of undergraduate 
student participants was 55% female and largely from the freshman and sophomore class 
(M education in years = 13.52, SE = 0.10). Ethnicities represented in the sample were 
European American (72%), Hispanic (17%), African American (4%), Asian (5%) or 
other (2%). The mean age of participants was 19.57 (SE = 0.11) years and the mean 
vocabulary score was 29.81 (SE = 0.28). There were no between group differences in 
age (F(1, 168) = 0.11, MSE = 2.02, p = .74, η2p < .01) or education (F(1, 170) = 0.65, 
MSE = 1.57, p = .42, η2p < .01). However, although there was less than a two-item mean 
difference in vocabulary ability, experimental condition participants (M vocabulary = 
30.51, SE = 0.39) had significantly greater vocabulary scores than control condition 
participants (M = 29.10, SE = 0.39, F(1, 170) = 6.45, MSE = 13.10, p = .01, η2p = .04). 
When participants’ vocabulary scores are included as a covariate in the main analyses, 
the interaction term, which is the critical effect in Experiment 1, remains statistically 
significant.  
 Materials. Swahili-English paired associates were taken from Nelson and 
Dunlosky (1994) (see Appendix for the sample of paired associates used in the following 
experiments). All of the paired associates produced less than 52% correct recall after 3 
learning trials, the English words had a frequency of occurrence of 50-100 words per 
million, and the Swahili words were rated as a 2-3 in wordlikeness on a 1-5 scale where 
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1 meant “not like a word at all” and 5 meant “very like a word” (see Nelson & 
Dunlosky).  
 Procedure. After giving consent to participate, participants studied 20 Swahili-
English paired associates that were presented via computer and were on screen for 6 
seconds per paired associate. Following study all participants were told that they would 
take a cued-recall test in approximately five minutes and that they should make a 
performance prediction as a percentage (i.e., 0-100%). After making the prediction, 
participants in the experimental condition rated their confidence that their performance 
prediction was accurate on a scale of 1-10, where 10 indicated absolute confidence the 
prediction was accurate and 1 indicated no confidence the prediction was accurate. 
Participants in the control condition did not rate their confidence that the prediction was 
accurate. After making the performance prediction (and rating confidence in the 
experimental condition), participants made a second performance prediction. 
Participants were instructed to make a second prediction with verbal and written 
instructions that the second prediction should be as accurate as possible but could go up, 
down, or stay the same. In the experimental condition, participants also made a second 
confidence judgment and received and instruction that their confidence in the second 
performance prediction should increase. After participants made their second prediction 
there was a 5-min retention interval. During the retention interval participants took a 
vocabulary test (Zachary, 1986).  
 After the retention interval participants took a cued-recall memory test in which 
the Swahili word was provided and they wrote the English equivalent. Participants were 
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told they would have 5-min to complete the memory test but that additional time would 
be given if needed. Following the memory test, participants completed a demographics 
questionnaire and answered 3 post-questions where they reported 1) why they thought 
they were asked to adjust their performance prediction, 2) what their thought processes 
were while adjusting their prediction, and 3) the reason why they lowered, raised, or kept 
their performance prediction.  
2.1.2  Results  
 Original and adjusted calibration scores were calculated by subtracting each 
participant’s performance from their original prediction. From this calculation, positive 
values indicate overconfidence and negative values indicate underconfidence. My 
prediction that original calibration scores between conditions would be equivalent was 
verified (F(1, 170) = 3.51, MSE = 432.33, p = .06, η2p = .02) as was the prediction that 
performance between conditions would be equivalent (F(1, 170) = 1.86, MSE = 165.54, 
p = .18, η2p = .01, see Tables 1 for means and standard errors).  
Related to the purpose of the current experiment – to improve metacognition – 
results from the mixed randomized repeated measures ANOVA indicated main effects of 
calibration (F(1, 170) = 9.32, MSE = 92.35, p = .003, η2p = .05) and condition (F(1, 170) 
= 7.16, MSE = 777.24, p = .008, η2p = .04) as well as a significant interaction (F(1, 170) 
= 4.13, MSE = 92.35, p = .04, η2p = .02, see Figure 1).  
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That is, participants’ adjusted performance predictions (M = 14.74, SE = 1.64) were 
significantly more accurate than their original performance predictions (M = 17.90, SE = 
1.60). Participants in the experimental condition were also significantly more calibrated 
(M = 12.30, SE = 1.94) than control condition participants (M = 20.34, SE = 2.29) in 
general. But both main effects were qualified by the significant interaction effect. 
Planned comparisons showed that the accuracy of participants’ predictions in the 
experimental condition improved significantly from original (M = 14.93, SE = 2.14) to 
adjusted prediction (M = 9.66, SE = 2.14, t(85) = 2.92, p = .004, d = 0.32) whereas 
participants in the control condition had equivalent original (M = 20.87, SE = 2.34) and 
adjusted predictions (M = 19.81, SE = 2.36, t(85) = 1.04, p = .30, d = 0.11). Participants 
in the experimental condition had higher confidence in their adjusted performance 
predictions (M = 9.12, SE = 0.17) than their original predictions (M = 6.20, SE = .20, 
t(85) = 15.46, p < .001, d = 1.67).  
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Table 1.  
     Experiment 1 mean recall, predictions, calibration for all predictions, and confidence by condition 
Condition   Recall 
Original 
Prediction 
Adjusted 
Prediction 
Original 
Calibration 
Adjusted 
Calibration 
Control 13.72 (1.42) 34.59 (2.29) 33.54 (2.26) 20.87 (2.34) 19.81 (2.36) 
       Experimental 16.40 (1.35) 31.44 (1.94) 26.17 (2.04) 14.93 (2.14) 9.66 (2.14) 
  Confidence      6.20 (0.20)   9.12 (0.17)     
Note. Recall and predictions are expressed as a percentage of the total items studied (20). Participants reported 
confidence on a scale of 0-10. Calibration is calculated by subtracting performance from prediction. Standard errors 
shown in parentheses.   
 
48 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Experiment 1 calibration scores for original and adjusted predictions by 
condition. 
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Calibration results were also examined in separate mixed randomized repeated 
measures ANOVAs as a function of low and high performing groups based on recall 
performance. High performing participants’ calibration scores improved regardless of 
condition (F(1, 84) = 6.28, MSE = 64.98, p = .01, η2p = .07) as indicated by a significant 
main effect of calibration. The condition main effect was also significant due to 
experimental condition participants being more calibrated in general (F(1, 84) = 5.15, 
MSE = 913.36,  p = .03, η2p = .06). The interaction term was not significant (F(1, 84) = 
1.18, MSE = 64.98, p = .28, η2p = .01). On the other hand, the main effect of calibration 
for low performing participants’ was statistically non-significant (F(1, 84) = 3.73, MSE 
= 121.30, p = .06, η2p = .04). Similarly, the interaction term did not reach significance 
(F(1, 84) = 2.92, MSE = 121.30, p = .09, η2p = .03). Finally, the between-subjects 
condition main effect was statistically non-significant (F(1, 84) = 2.53, MSE = 540.57, p 
= .12, η2p = .03). At least on visual inspection of the low performers’ calibration results, 
it appears that low performers were able to gain some calibration accuracy in their 
adjusted predictions after having first reported subjective confidence.  
2.1.3  Summary 
The important finding from Experiment 1 is that when participants were 
instructed to use subjective confidence about the accuracy of their original prediction 
when making a second (adjusted) prediction, their predictions became significantly more 
accurate. In contrast, control condition participants’ adjusted predictions were not more 
or less accurate than their original predictions. Given that participants were only able to 
adjust their predictions one time, it is not known whether participants were maximally 
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calibrated or if there could be continuous improvement in calibration given the 
opportunity to adjust predictions multiple times.  
2.2  Experiment 2 – continuous improvement 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to identify whether or not the calibration 
improvement seen in Experiment 1 would continue when participants were asked to 
adjust their performance predictions more than once using subjective confidence as a 
guide. Given this purpose, the design, materials, and procedure were similar to 
Experiment 1 with a few key exceptions described below.  
2.2.1  Method 
 Design. Experiment 2 used a 2 Condition (Experimental and Control) X 4 
Performance Prediction (Original, Adjusted1, Adjusted2 and Adjusted3) mixed 
randomized repeated model. As in Experiment 1, Condition served as the randomized 
between subjects independent variable and Performance Prediction served as the 
repeated measures independent variable. The dependent variable of interest was the 
calibration score for the original performance prediction and the calibration scores for 
the subsequent adjusted performance predictions. Other variables, including 
demographic variables and vocabulary ability were also measured. 
 Participants. Participants were 140 undergraduate students from Texas A&M 
University who participated for partial course credit. The sample of undergraduate 
student participants was 61% female and largely from the freshman and sophomore class 
(M education = 12.77, SE = 0.07). Ethnicities represented in the sample were European 
American (72%), Hispanic (2%), African American (9%), Asian (1%) and other (14%), 
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three participants did not report ethnicity. The mean age of participants was 18.82 years 
(SE = 0.08) and the mean vocabulary ability was 29.34 (SE = 0.30). To anticipate, there 
were no between group differences in age (F(1, 138) = 3.12, MSE = 0.83, p = .08, η2p = 
.02) or vocabulary (F(1, 138) = 0.51, MSE = 12.78, p = .48, η2p < .01). Participants in the 
control condition had higher education levels (M = 12.99, SE = 0.10) than participants in 
the experimental condition (M = 12.55, SE = 0.10) (F(1, 138) = 9.83, MSE = .70, p = 
.002, η2p = .07). When years of education were included as a covariate in the main 
analyses, the pattern of findings is the same compared to when no covariates are 
included.  
 Materials and procedure. The materials used in Experiment 2 were exactly the 
same the materials used in Experiment 1. The procedure was similar but included a key 
modification to ask participants to make more than one adjusted performance prediction. 
Participants studied 20 Swahili-English paired associates that were presented via 
computer and were on screen for 6 seconds per paired associate. Following study, all 
participants were told that they would take a cued-recall test in five minutes and were 
asked to make a performance prediction as a percentage (i.e., 0-100%). Participants in 
the experimental condition were then be asked to rate their confidence that the 
performance prediction is accurate. These participants were then asked to change their 
performance prediction so that they could be more confident their prediction was 
accurate. They were also given the additional instruction that their “adjusted 
performance predictions should be as accurate as possible and can go up, down, or stay 
the same, but if you are following the instructions, your confidence in the new prediction 
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should increase.” After this additional instruction participants made an adjusted 
performance prediction and rated their confidence in the new prediction. This cycle, (i.e., 
prediction-confidence) was repeated two more times for participants in the 3 adjustment 
condition. Participants in the control condition were asked to make an original 
performance prediction and three adjusted performance predictions without having made 
any confidence ratings. Note that they were also told “adjusted performance predictions 
should be as accurate as possible and can go up, down, or stay the same.”  
2.2.2  Results 
 The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine if improved calibration that was 
seen in Experiment 1 continues when participants adjust their predictions multiple times. 
Thus, the principal hypothesis was that participants’ adjusted performance predictions 
would be significantly more calibrated than their original performance predictions in the 
experimental but not the control condition. 
 As before, calibration scores were calculated by subtracting each participant’s 
performance from their prediction. Thus, positive calibration scores indicate 
overconfidence. Results indicated no differences between groups for original calibration 
scores (F(1, 138) = 0.05, MSE = 513.42, p = .83, η2p < .01) or recall performance (F(1, 
138) = 1.67, MSE = 146.86, p = .20, η2p = .01, see Tables 2 and 3). To the point of the 
experiment, a repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant Calibration X 
Condition interaction (F(1.72, 237.61) = 6.18, MSE = 91.78, p < .004, η2p = .04; see 
Figure 2). Main effects of calibration (F(1.72, 237.61) = 2.24, MSE = 91.78, p = .12, η2p 
= .02) and condition (F(1, 138) = 0.74, MSE = 2034.02, p = .39, η2p = .01) were non-
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significant. Note that due to a violation of sphericity, the error term degrees of freedom 
were adjusted using the Huynh-Feldt adjustment (Huynh & Feldt, 1976) for the previous 
results and future results in Experiment 2. To follow up the significant interaction, 
separate repeated measures ANOVAs for the control and experimental conditions were 
run. For the experimental condition, the simple effect of calibration was significant 
(F(1.55, 106.62) = 7.87, MSE  = 101.10, p = .002, η2p = .10). Experimental condition 
participants’ final predictions were significantly more accurate than their first and 
second predictions (p = .002 and p = .02 respectively). Furthermore, participants’ second 
and third predictions were significantly more accurate than their first predictions (p = 
.005 for both comparisons). In contrast, the simple effect of calibration for control 
condition participants was not significant (F(1.74, 120.37) = 0.49, MSE  = 88.35, p = 
.59, η2p = .01). Confidence among experimental condition participants was also 
significantly greater for each subsequent prediction (F(1.88, 129.89) = 125.61, MSE  = 
1.19, p < .001, η2p = .65).  
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Table 2.  
     
Experiment 2 mean recall, original and all adjusted predictions, and confidence for the experimental condition  
Condition Recall 
Original 
Prediction 
Adjusted 
Prediction 1 
Adjusted 
Prediction 2 
Adjusted 
Prediction 3 
Control 15.64 (1.70) 34.02 (2.67) 34.76 (2.84) 35.02 (2.86) 35.46 (3.09) 
       Experimental 13.00 (1.14) 32.20 (2.55) 28.95 (2.48) 27.94 (2.53) 26.50 (2.55) 
 
Confidence 
 
   7.11 (0.30)    8.93 (0.30)    9.39 (0.20)    9.68 (0.20) 
Note. Recall and predictions are expressed as a percentage of the total items studied (20). Participants reported 
confidence on a scale of 0-10. Standard errors shown in parentheses.   
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Table 3.  
   Experiment 2 calibration for original and all adjusted predictions 
Condition 
Original 
Calibration 
Adjusted 
Calibration 1 
Adjusted 
Calibration 2 
Adjusted 
Calibration 3 
Control 18.38 (2.85) 19.11 (2.98) 19.38 (2.92) 19.81 (3.10) 
      Experimental 19.20 (2.56) 15.95 (2.57) 14.94 (2.65) 13.50 (2.69) 
Note. Calibration is calculated by subtracting performance from prediction. Standard errors 
shown in parentheses.   
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Figure 2. Experiment 2 calibration scores for original and all adjusted predictions by 
condition. 
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Again, one can also analyze the data as a function of low and high performance 
groups using separate repeated measures ANOVAs. For high performing participants 
there was no effect of condition (F(1, 68) = .17, MSE = 2318.82, p = .68, η2p < .01) or 
calibration (F(1.80, 122.53) = 2.43, MSE = 111.92, p = .10, , η2p = .04). However, there 
was a significant interaction (F(1.80, 122.53) = 6.28, MSE = 111.92, p = .003, η2p = .09), 
such that experimental condition participants improved their prediction accuracy but 
control condition participants did not. Follow-up analyses on the significant interaction 
indicated a significant effect of calibration (F(1.69, 57.50) = 8.13, MSE = 120.15, p = 
.001, η2p = .19) in the experimental condition. And post-hoc analyses confirmed that 
participants’ final adjusted predictions were more accurate than the original and second 
performance predictions (p = .005 and p = .02 respectively) and participants’ third and 
second predictions were more accurate than the original prediction (p = .005 and p = 
.01). 
 For low performers there were no main effects of condition (F(1, 68) = .72, MSE 
= 1676.94, p = .40, η2p = .01) or calibration (F(1.64, 111.71) = .19, MSE = 63.94, p = 
.78, η2p < .01). Nor was there a significant interaction (F(1.64, 111.71) = .82, MSE = 
63.94, p = .42, η2p = .01). These results confirm that low performers, even when they 
used subjective confidence as a guide to adjust their performance predictions, could not 
become more metacognitively accurate.  
2.2.3  Summary 
 Using the same materials and procedures as Experiment 1 with the key 
modification that participants made 3 adjusted performance predictions rather than 1, the 
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results showed that continuous improvement in metacognitive calibration is possible 
when participants focus on their subjective confidence as a guide to recalibrate their 
predictions. The largest calibration improvement occurred between the first prediction 
and second predictions, but the final prediction was also more accurate than the second 
prediction. When participants were split into low and high performing groups based on 
recall, high performing participants seemed to be more capable of using subjective 
confidence as a guide to recalibrate than low performing participants.  
2.3  Experiment 3 – influence on control 
 The purpose of the final experiment was to examine the influence of improved 
metacognitive monitoring on metacognitive control. The Nelson and Narens (1990) 
model of the metacognition posits that metacognitive control is downstream of 
metacognitive monitoring. The effectiveness of metacognitive control is contingent on 
the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring. Therefore, given that the results from the 
previous two experiments indicated that participants could improve their metacognitive 
monitoring by making subjective confidence judgments, one would predict that there 
would be corresponding improvements in metacognitive control. In the current design, 
metacognitive control was operationalized as the decision to restudy to-be-remember 
material and overall allocation of study time. When participants decided to restudy the 
list, they were required to restudy the whole list.   
2.3.1  Method  
 Design. Experiment 3 used a between subjects design in which participants were 
randomly placed in either the Experimental or Control condition. The dependent 
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variables of interest were the number of times participants decided to restudy the TBR 
material, overall study time, and recall performance. Participants’ performance 
prediction calibration and other variables, including demographic variables and 
vocabulary ability were also measured. 
 Participants. Participants were 140 undergraduate students from Texas A&M 
University who participated for partial course credit. The sample of undergraduate 
student participants was 51% female and largely from the freshman and sophomore class 
(M education = 13.28, SE = 0.08). Ethnicities represented in the sample were European 
American (70%), Hispanic (20%), African American (3%), Asian (6%) and other (1%), 
one participant did not report ethnicity. The mean age of participants was 19.01 years 
(SE = 0.09) and the mean vocabulary ability was 29.37 (SE = 0.32). There were no 
between-group differences in age, vocabulary, or education.  
 Materials and procedure. Again the materials in Experiment 3 were the same as 
the materials used in the previous two experiments. The procedure was modified 
significantly. Prior to study, participants were informed that their goal of study, also 
known as the norm-of-study, was to be able to remember at least 15 out of 20 items on 
the memory test. Participants were also told that they should only stop studying when 
they believed they could recall at least 15 items on the memory test. To motivate 
participants to comply with this request, participants were told they would be given an 
unspecified prize at the end of the experiment for reaching the goal. Similar to previous 
experiments, participants in Experiment 3 studied the paired associates at a pace of 6 
seconds per paired associate. After each time a participant studied the paired-associates, 
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he or she reported a performance prediction on a scale of 0-20 items. Participants in the 
experimental condition also rated their confidence that their performance prediction was 
accurate. Following the performance prediction (and confidence rating in the 
experimental condition) all participants were given the choice to restudy the paired-
associates or to continue to the memory test. If the participant chose to restudy the 
associates, he or she studied all items in the study-list with the added option to manually 
advance the study list or allow the presentation software to automatically advance after 
6secs, whichever occurred first. Following restudy, participants were given the same 
choice as before, to either restudy or take the test. There was no maximum limit on the 
number of restudy sessions. When participants chose to take the test, he or she took the 
memory test after an approximately 5-min retention interval (as in the previous 
experiments).  
2.3.2  Results 
 The purpose for Experiment 3 was to examine how reporting subjective 
confidence after a performance prediction would influence metacognitive control. The 
principal hypothesis was that participants in the experimental condition, who rated their 
subjective confidence in addition to making a performance prediction, would choose 
additional study time more frequently than participants in the control condition. Given 
the increased study time, I also predicted participants in the experimental condition 
would have higher recall performance on the memory test compared to control condition 
participants.  
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 There were no differences between groups for participants’ first predictions (F(1, 
138) = .10, MSE = 1.21, p = .75, η2p < .01, see Table 4). Note that in the previous 
experiments, I compared participants’ first calibration scores, but in Experiment 3, 
because participants were able to study the items as many times as they chose to, 
calibration would not be the most appropriate comparison to ensure that the groups were 
similar to begin the experiment. The main analyses of Experiment 3 indicated no effect 
of condition on participants’ decision to continue study. Participants in the experimental 
condition (M study sessions = 3.36, SE = 0.23) did not study any more than participants 
in the control condition (M = 3.61 SE = 0.26; F(1, 138) = .53, MSE = 4.37, p = .47, η2p < 
.01, see Table 5). Accordingly, total time studying was not different between the 
experimental condition (M study time (min) = 5.66, SE = 0.39) and the control condition 
(M = 6.09, SE = 0.41; F(1, 138) = .59, MSE = 11.26, p = .45, η2p < .01). Likely because 
there was very little difference in total number of study sessions or study time, there 
were no between-group differences in memory performance between the experimental 
condition (M recall = 9.36, SE = 0.67) and the control condition (M = 10.26, SE = 0.70; 
F(1, 138) = .87, MSE = 32.50, p = .35, η2p < .01). 
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Table 4.  
     Experiment 3 mean recall, original and final predictions, confidence for the experimental condition, with 
calibration for original and final predictions 
Condition Recall 
Original 
Prediction 
Final 
Prediction 
Original 
Calibration 
Final 
Calibration 
Control 51.29 (3.49) 39.00 (2.05) 12.83 (0.47) -12.29 (4.06) 12.86 (3.09) 
       Experimental 46.79 (3.33) 38.07 (2.12) 12.63 (0.41) -8.71 (4.10) 16.36 (2.94) 
  Confidence      5.99 (0.26)   6.54 (0.22)     
Note. Recall, original prediction, and final prediction are expressed as a percentage of the total items studied 
(20). Calibration is calculated by subtracting performance from prediction. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses.  
 
 
 
Table 5.  
  Experiment 3 total number of study sessions and total 
study time (min) 
Condition Study Sessions 
Study Time 
(min) 
Control 3.61 (0.26) 6.09 (0.41) 
    Experimental 
 
3.36 (0.23) 5.66 (0.39) 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
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If performance group (as determined by recall) is included in the analysis, 
making it a 2 (Condition: experimental and control) x 2 (Performance group: low and 
high), condition still did not influence participants’ decision to study more by total 
number of sessions (F(1, 136) = .62, MSE = 3.75, p = .43, η2p < .01) or by time (F(1, 
136) = .68, MSE = 9.73, p = .41, η2p < .01). In contrast, high performers did choose to 
study more times (F(1, 136) = 24.79, MSE = 3.75, p < .001, η2p = .15) and for more total 
time (F(1, 136) = 23.27, MSE = 9.73, p < .001, η2p = .15) than low performers overall. 
However the interaction effects were non-significant, showing that low and high 
performers were similarly affected by condition for number of study sessions (F(1, 136) 
= .12, MSE = 3.75, p = .73, η2p < .01) and total time studying (F(1, 136) = .36, MSE = 
9.73, p = .55, η2p < .01).  
2.3.3  Summary 
Nelson and Narens’ (1990) model of metacognition contains two processes – 
monitoring and control processes. They argued that monitoring processes monitor 
ongoing cognitive activity and allow people to update the desired state of cognition. That 
is, if people want to recall 15 items in a list, they would monitor ongoing learning and 
compare that level of learning to the desired state. If people believe that they have 
learned 15 items, they would use control processes to discontinue study. Given the 
connection between monitoring and control processes, improving the fidelity of 
metacognitive monitoring should lead to an accompanying improvement in 
metacognitive control. In Experiment 3 though, improved metacognitive monitoring was 
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not accompanied by improved control processes. Possible reasons why there were no 
improvements will be considered in the general discussion.  
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3. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The experiments in this dissertation were inspired by the classroom finding that 
low performers have lower subjective confidence in their predictions compared to high 
performers (Miller & Geraci, 2011c). The goal of the current studies was to test whether 
asking participants to focus on confidence before making predictions would improve 
their metacognitive monitoring and subsequent metacognitive control. In Experiment 1, 
participants studied Swahili-English paired associates and made a prediction about their 
future memory performance, one group also made a confidence judgment about the 
accuracy of the prediction. Then both groups make a second performance prediction 
about their future memory performance. In Experiment 2, participants made four 
consecutive performance predictions, with the experimental group making confidence 
judgments after each prediction. The results from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that 
indeed, metacognitive monitoring accuracy was improved when participants made 
confidence judgments between performance predictions but not in the control condition 
when participants only made performance predictions. In Experiment 1, participants’ 
second performance prediction was more accurate than their original performance 
prediction and in Experiment 2 all adjusted predictions were more accurate than the 
original prediction. Moreover, in Experiment 2, the final prediction was more accurate 
than the second prediction indicating that even after 3 adjustments participants could still 
improve their metacognitive accuracy.   
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 An important finding of the present study is the efficiency with which reporting 
subjective confidence improved participants’ metacognitive monitoring accuracy. Other 
successful attempts to improve or train metacognitive monitoring in the laboratory are 
often time-intensive. Some regimens required as many as 23 hours of training distributed 
over multiple days (Lichtenstein & Fischoff, 1980), weekly or semi-regular training for 
16 weeks (Miller & Geraci, 2011b; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2006), or hour-long 
sessions distributed over five days (Adams & Adams, 1958; Kelemen et al., 2007). 
These training studies also included detailed feedback and descriptions of calibration to 
the participants. In contrast, the present study required neither explanations of calibration 
nor feedback and participants showed immediate improvement in their metacognitive 
accuracy.  
 Although the data unequivocally suggest that calibration improves following 
participants’ subjective confidence reports, the current studies do not explain why 
calibration improved. One explanation is that participants were required to think more 
carefully about the state of their knowledge when they made confidence judgments and 
this more careful consideration led to more accurate predictions. This hypothesis is 
consistent with the process-oriented class of modifications that have been used to debias 
retrospective confidence judgments (Keren, 1990). Process-oriented modifications to 
improve calibration are preferable over response-oriented modifications. One example of 
a response-oriented modification is explaining to a participant that people are 
overconfident and when they make their prediction they should automatically lower the 
prediction. In this way, response-oriented modifications only changes participants’ 
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metacognitive calibration because they have an abstract awareness of the overconfidence 
effect but they do not actually consider how the overconfidence effect applies to the state 
of their own knowledge or future performance. Thus, the effect of response-oriented 
modifications may be more transient than a process-oriented modification. 
 It is assumed that process-oriented modifications are longer lasting than 
response-oriented modifications, but this an empirical question. Future research might 
explore the lasting benefits of reporting subjective confidence and adjusting performance 
predictions. Answering this question could be accomplished multiple ways. For 
example, one could simply ask participants to report subjective confidence before one 
memory test but not before future memory tests. Alternatively, an experimenter might 
ask a participant to report subjective confidence between performance predictions for a 
series of memory tests and examine if first predictions become more calibrated over 
time. In this way, one could determine if participants learned something about their 
learning capabilities and whether or not having the experience thinking more deeply 
about their own learning and knowledge conferred benefits to calibration for future tests.  
 Related to this last point is the question of generalization to future contexts. In 
the present paradigm, participants studied foreign language-English word pairs (e.g., 
lulu-pearl) and then made predictions about their future performance on a memory test. 
While this sort of rote-memorization paradigm is easy to create in the lab, its 
generalization to other learning situations may be limited to language learning. The 
effect of reporting subjective confidence between predictions when more conceptual 
learning is required has yet to be determined. In addition, this would need to be tested in 
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the classroom setting where there are lots of other variables at play to determine if the 
effect generalizes to real-life testing situations.  
 An alternative hypothesis of the improved calibration effect seen in Experiments 
1 and 2 is that the passage of time, from the first to subsequent predictions, was the 
cause for participants’ recalibration, akin to a delayed-JOL effect. However, results from 
the control conditions, which show no significant calibration improvement, argue against 
this hypothesis.  Because a similar amount of time elapsed between the predictions in the 
control and experimental conditions but only the experimental condition showed 
improvement suggesting that reporting subjective confidence between predictions led to 
the improvement in calibration.  
 The results also suggest that having participants make confidence ratings 
disproportionally benefitted calibration for high performing participants – a finding that 
has been referred as the “Matthew Effect.” Interventions that disproportionally benefit 
higher performing participants are frequent. For example, Kelemen et al. (2007) showed 
that after 5 study sessions and performance predictions, higher performing participants’ 
predictions became more calibrated whereas there was no change in calibration for lower 
performing participants. In another study, low performing participants actually became 
more overconfident in the intervention condition relative to control, but high performers 
recalibrated in the intervention condition (Ehrlinger et al., 2008). One study has shown, 
however, that low performing participants’ metacognitive accuracy can be improved 
when they are given incentives and feedback (Miller & Geraci, 2011b). Perhaps because 
neither feedback nor incentives were provided in the current experiments, lower 
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performing participants could not recalibrate their predictions. Future research should 
seek interventions that benefit both groups of participants or even interventions that 
target low performing participants.  
 With the finding that providing confidence judgments can improve metacognitive 
monitoring established in Experiments 1 and 2, Experiment 3 examined whether 
providing confidence judgments could also affect metacognitive control. The important 
model of metacognition posits that there is a loop, with metacognitive monitoring 
processes informing metacognitive control processes (Nelson & Narens, 1990). This 
model suggests that improvements in monitoring should be accompanied by 
improvements in control. The results from Experiment 3 indicated that there was no 
effect of making confidence judgments on metacognitive control. Metacognitive control 
was operationalized as the number of times participants chose to restudy the to-be-
remembered material when they were given a norm-of-study. Participants who had 
reported confidence about the accuracy of their predictions did not study more than 
control condition participants, who did not make confidence judgments. Another 
analysis of the data showed that barely 20% of the participant sample (n = 30) predicted 
they would remember 15 or more of the items and actually remembered 15 or more of 
the items. Perhaps, the 15 item norm-of-study was simply too high. Lowering the norm-
of-study may reveal a beneficial effect of confidence judgments on metacognitive 
control in future research.  
 Both correlational and experimental research designs have shown the connection 
between improved monitoring and improved control and performance outcomes 
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(Everson & Tobias, 1998; Nelson et al., 1994; Nietfeld, Cao, & Osborne, 2006; Thiede, 
1999; Thiede et al., 2003) so it is unlikely that the model of metacognition is incorrect. 
Another suggestion as to why metacognitive control was not influenced is that 
monitoring was not improved. I believe this suggestion can be disputed given that there 
were consistent monitoring improvements in Experiments 1 and 2. Rather there may 
implementation reasons why there was no connection between improved monitoring and 
improved control in Experiment 3.  First, the lack of effect of making confidence 
judgments on study time could have been due to a lack of motivation among 
participants. For students to choose the option to keep studying the items they must be 
motivated to do so. From the instructions, each participant read that their goal, or norm-
of-study, was to remember at least fifteen items. And if their memory performance was 
15 items or more, they would receive a “prize.” It is possible participants were not 
motivated to earn the prize and were content knowing they would not remember fifteen 
or more items. In fact, barely 25% of the sample had recall performance of 15 or more 
items and the percentage of participants with a final prediction of 15 or more items was 
only 59%. Motivating participants more than what was accomplished in the present 
experiments could reveal the monitoring and control relationship that was hypothesized. 
A second reason why improved monitoring did may not have lead to improved control in 
Experiment 3 is that the manipulation takes time for participants to trust that their 
subjective confidence reports about their predictions are better indicators of learning 
than their performance predictions. Perhaps more experience and feedback about the 
benefits of reporting subjective confidence would eventually lead to added benefits for 
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metacognitive control. Or the manipulation could affect study strategies on something 
more subtle than allocation of study time.   
 Based on the results of Experiments 1 and 2, there are at least two future research 
agendas that are most pressing. The first is to continue to explore the boundary of the 
improved calibration effect. Experiment 2 included one original prediction and three 
adjusted predictions. The results indicated that participants’ calibration was improved at 
the third adjusted prediction relative to the first and second prediction. The obvious 
question then is – would participants continue to recalibrate if asked to make a fourth or 
fifth adjusted prediction? By definition, there is a limit to the accuracy of metacognitive 
monitoring, and so determining the number of predictions required to reach complete 
accuracy would be informative.   
 In addition, future research must determine if underconfident performance 
predictions can be recalibrated using the subjective confidence intervention. Or, does 
making confidence ratings only decrease performance predictions? Certainly, 
overconfident predictions are more problematic than underconfident judgments in a real-
life testing situation because overconfidence would result in discontinuing study or in 
other settings, overconfidence means continuing to drive longer than one is able or using 
a gun without gun safety knowledge. Because they are more problematic, overconfident 
judgments were the focus in these dissertation studies. And the results indicated that 
overconfident judgments could be recalibrated. One might suggest limiting the analyses 
in the current dataset to only underconfident predictions to determine if they were 
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recalibrated. But because the paradigm was designed to elicit overconfidence there were 
very few underconfident predictions making such analyses imprudent.  
 One setting where the present findings are applicable is in educational practice. 
Students regularly make predictions about how much they know (or do not know) of the 
to-be-remembered material. Conceivably, decisions to keep studying or discontinue 
studying are tied to these predictions. And so decisions based on predictions have a 
lasting impact on students’ lives by influencing exam scores, course grades, graduation, 
and eventual career choices. Methods to improve the accuracy of students’ predictions, 
including reporting subjective confidence, could be used in school settings during study. 
Future research could explore how such practices could be implemented at all levels of 
education.  
 A core-finding in metacognitive research is that participants are very often 
overconfident about their future performance (Bol et al., 2005; Burson et al., 2006; 
Hacker et al., 2000; Kelemen et al., 2007; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Krueger & Mueller, 
2002; Miller & Geraci, 2011b). In the present experiments, participants were as much as 
25% overconfident about their future memory performance. This is a striking 
dissociation between monitoring and actual performance. Are people hopelessly 
unaware of their own cognition? Perhaps not – in the classroom, previous research 
showed that although low performers’ over predicted performance they were not 
confident about these predictions was low, indicating to us that there may be some 
awareness among low performers that their predictions were too high (Miller & Geraci, 
2011c). The research presented here takes advantage of the seemingly privileged access 
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of confidence judgments to a person’s real state of knowledge to improve prediction 
accuracy. The results suggest that requiring participants to focus on their confidence in 
their performance predictions offers one promising method for reducing overconfidence.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Swahili English 
ankra Invoice 
bahasha Envelope 
chaza Oyster 
chimbo Quarry 
desturi Custom 
duara Wheel 
fahali Bull 
gharika Flood 
jibini Cheese 
kamba Rope 
kasuku Parrot 
ladha Flavor 
lawama Blame 
nafaka Corn 
nanga Anchor 
nira Yoke 
sahani Plate 
talaka Divorce 
ubini Forgery 
yamini Oath 
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